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ABSTRACT:
This paper describes the evolution of Austrian
exchange rate and monetary policy as an example of the
benefits of policy coordination and credibility. This
policy improved the performance of the Central Bank in
achieving its twin objective of stabilizing the
internal and external value of the currency. In this
process, policymakers have sought to exploit the
advantages of credibility by building a reputation for
sticking to their policy. The evidence presented
exhibits the increased coordination between Austrian
and German nominal aggregates in the course of time.
These accomplishments have apparently not required
tying the real performance of the Austrian economy to
any adverse permanent real consequences of German
monetary policy, in particular, to its
inflation-unemployment trade off.
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I. Introduction
The evolution of Austrian exchange rate and monetary policy
illustrates the benefits of policy coordination and credibility1).
The emergence of Austria’s hard currency policy followed from
policymakers’ recognition of the benefits from coordination of
economic policy with other countries, especially with Germany. The
importance of making credible both the feasibility of this policy
and Austria’s commitment to it emerged very soon.
Austria is a small open economy with high capital mobility; its
exchange rate policy currently pegs its currency to that of a low-
inflation anchor currency, i.e. the Deutsche mark. Since the
breakdown of the Bretton Woods Agreement, twenty years ago,
however, there have been two distinct periods or regimes for
Austrian monetary and exchange rate policies:
i) In the l970s, exchange rate policy was discussed in terms
of price stabilization, the ability to import stability, and
the role of the real appreciation of the schilling in this
process. A limited float against each currency aimed at
pursuing the domestic inflation goal. Monetary measures were
more discretionary during this period.
ii) At the end of the 1970s and in the 1980s; the necessary
harmonization of fundamentals between the anchor country and
Austria was emphasized; the idea of stabilizing expectations
1) Kahn (1987) provides a useful description of the benefits and
9-hc~ ~i-~ nf nclfcv coordination. - -2
also became central to policy discussions. Since then,
Austria’s monetary policy has been characterized as a ‘hard
currency option’.
Policy developments in the recent period can be viewed as attempts
to achieve policy coordination and to foster the credibility and
reputation of the monetary authorities. A growing literature
points to the significant role of credibility and reputation in
economic policy in individual countries, and these issues also
bear great importance in the context of the European Monetary
System and the European Monetary Union. Thus, the focus of
discussion in Austria has also shifted to these issues. The
credibility of Austria’s exchange rate policy was widely achieved
at the beginning of the 1980s, but challenges to this credibility,
or to Austria’s commitment to its policy, have occurred
subsequently and are inevitable in the future. Such challenges
have clarified the real economic significance of credibility and
reputation and strenghtened the understanding of their role in the
successful implementation of the hard currency policy.
The evolution of the Austrian exchange rate policy has been
presented elsewhere (Handler 1989, Hochreiter and Knöbl 1991, and
others), so only a short historical outline is presented—in the
next section. Then we examine some evidence on the effects of
changes in Austrian policy coordination.
II. The Evolution of the Hard Currency Policy
When the Bretton Woods System came to an end and the United States
closed the gold window in August 1971, Austria had to reconsider
the anchor for its exchange rate and monetary policy. A free float
was not seriously considered because of the supposed uncertainties
connected with it, and especially the impact of these
•uncertainties on contracts. It was widely believed that these
uncertainties would permanently lower economic activity and make
it more volatile. As a result, Austria was one of the first3
countries to monitor an effective exchange rate and to use it as
an ‘indicator’ for policy.
The indicator comprised the currencies of nine important trading
partners (German mark, Swiss franc, Dutch guilder, Belgian franc,
Swedish, Norwegian and Danish krona, Lira and Pound Sterling).
These were not exactly the most important trading partners. The
French franc, for instance, was not included, nor was the dollar.
The nine cu~encieswere weighted into a basket according to their
trade weights (only trade in goods was taken into account, not
trade in services or capital transactions).
The adoption of such a basket as an indicator for policy was based
on Austria’s National Bank Act which defines price stability as
the primary task and responsibility of the Austrian National Bank.
Article 3 of paragraph 2 explicitly says that the Bank “...has to
ensure with all the means at its disposal that the value of the
Austrian currency is maintained with regard both to its domestic
purchasing power and to its relationship with stable foreign
currencies. “2)
Following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods Agreement this task
was interpreted as requiring that the value of the schilling be
stabilized relative to currencies with relatively stable domestic
prices, that is, currencies whose external value had been rising
relative to other countries with higher inflation rates. This was
expected to keep the rise of Austrian import prices relatively
low. In a small open economy with a high import content in
production and consumption, with a fast pass-through of world
market prices to domestic prices, which, in turn, are passed
through to wages and costs, such a policy is expected to restrain
the domestic price level to a correspondingly high extent. Thus,
the currencies of those countries that, under floating, had
inflated their economies (i.e., the Pound Sterling and the Lira)
or that were devalued for reasons of competitiveness (Swedish
2) This dual stability objective is only consistent if the value
of the schilling is pegged to currencies which enjoy a stable
purchasing power. The subsequent evolution of exchange rate
policy can perhaps best be understoo~in terms of these twin4
Krona) were eliminated from the basket in the course of the
following years.
In 1973, Austria unilaterally declared its adherence to the
European snake, though not becoming an official member of this
arrangement. Thus, between this time and 1976 there were two
parallel guidelines, the snake and the indicator, but they never
seriously conflicted. However, the observed depreciation of other
snake currencies against the German mark implied, given attempts
to stabilize the indicator, a concomitant weakening of the
schilling against the Deutsche mark, as long as the snake’s
fluctuation limits (+1- 2 1/4 %) were adhered to. This problem was
resolved first by doubling the band acceptable to Austria and then
by dropping the snake orientation altogether and pegging the
schilling exclusively to the German mark.
This change in the orientation of the exchange rate regime was
also a consequence of another related Austrian innovation, the
role of real appreciations in the ‘hard currency policy’. In 1974,
inflation had surged world-wide in the wake of the first oil price
shock. In Austria the rate of inflation approached 10 percent.
Because of the pass-through effects that were inherent in the
Austrian system of social partnership, the schilling was revalued
by 4 1/2 percent to bring inflation down.
It was clear that this hard currency policy would result in a real
appreciation and in a worsening of the current account. Both
effects, however, were accepted by the policymakers as they were
confident that the domestic economy would adjust to the new
exchange rate level in due course. There was also the conviction
that an alternative exchange rate policy that focused on
competitiveness or employment would not succeed because wage
earners would react to devaluation-induced price increases and a
‘vicious circle’ would result. Experience in ‘soft currency’
countries had made this very clear (Hochreiter - Knäbl 1991).
Thus, three considerations were decisive for the development of
the hard currency policy. First, price stability can be imported
via the pass-through from the prices of imported goods to consumer5
prices or to the prices of production inputs. In some periods even
real appreciations were accepted despite adverse effects on the
current account. Second, appreciations cause a profit squeeze in
the exposed-sector that leads to rationalization, innovation,
rising productivity, and improved structure. It also prevents
excessive wage increases. Third, by these mechanisms - a lower
inflation rate as a precondition for the incomes policy and a
profit squeeze in the exposed sector limiting the possibilities
for wage increases - some ‘virtuous circle’ effects are brought
into play, validating the appreciated exchange rate in the longer
run.
Stabilizing Expectations
At the beginning of the 1980s, the Austrian economy faced a series
of national and international problems which had effects similar
to those of a negative supply shock. Again, the option of
devaluation was not chosen - on the one hand because of the long
held conviction that this would not produce lasting positive
effects, but also because the credibility of the hard currency
policy already had to be defended.
The authorities also recognized that in a world of high and rising
capital mobility a devaluation would raise the variability of -
exchange rates and that this effect would alter the public’s
expectations about future exchange rates. Once a devaluation was
effected - and reputation lost - these expectations would change.
More volatile capital flows and movements in the interest rate
differential could result. Policymakers believed that an important
role of the central bank was to stabilize the market participants’.
expectations by reducing, as much as possible, the uncertainties
about the future exchange rate.
In the short term, this is done by limiting exchange rate
fluctuations to an absolute minimum through the permanent presence
of the Bank in the foreign exchange market and by the adjustment
of interest rates. Austrian exchange market intervention goes -6
beyond the scope of conventional intervention. For example, it
encompasses measures to coordinate the timing of the federal
government’s capital imports with intervention policy (see, for
instance, Tichy 1986).
In the long run, however, stabilization of exchange rate
expectations can only be achieved if underlying macroeconomic
aggregates, or economic fundamentals, are also stabilized. Thus,
economic policy had to be coordinated with Germany if the
feasibility of the hard currency option was to become and remain
credible. In this respect, successful economic policy coordination
was a precondition for credibility.
‘Monopolistic Coordinal~ion’
The modern focus on international policy coordination was
initiated by Hamada (1976), and has largely been promoted by
discussions such as the ‘Group of Three (Five, Seven)’ meetings
about cooperation in macroeconomic policymaking and the analyses
of the costs and benefits of joining the European Monetary System.
The principal issue concerns the question of externalities in the
choice of macroeconomic policies by individual governments due to
international spill-over effects. A coordinated policy
internalizes these externalities by maximizing a weighted sum of
the governments’ objectives.
Concern for these externalities was preeminent following the
breakdown of Bretton Woods and was central to the adoption of the
exchange rate management system in the l970s and to early support
for the snake arrangement. In Austria, the volatility of the
foreign exchange market and the uncertainties related to it were
reduced, and the advantages of fixed exchange rates regained, to a
degree, by the evolution of close coordination with German
monetary policy. Such coordination, in effect, extends
reputational advantages (or disadvantages) of the Bundesbank to
Austrian policy so long as the Austrian and German policy is
credible. This policy also leads to an asymmetric convergence of -- 7
fundamentals, as Austrian economic developments and policy adjust
to innovations in German policy or fundamentals, but German policy
and fundamental developments are independent of Austrian
innovations. In effect, the German Bundesbank independently
chooses its monetary policy, while Austria - taking into account
its institutional and market-oriented peculiarities - ‘ties its
hands’ on exchange rate policy and adjusts its monetary policy to
international developments, transmitted essentially from the
anchor currency country.
A constellation like this has been labelled ‘monopolistic
coordination’ (Spahn 1991) and is characterised, first, by the
hegemonic position of the leading currency which is fully
acknowledged by the following country. Second, this type of policy
coordination can be reached without an institutional process of
joint decision-making in economic policy. The basic agreement is
possible because this constellation is in accordance with the
interests of the partners. Austria imports monetary stability and
reputation, while Germany need not take care of any adverse
monetary influences coming in the opposite direction, though they
should be small in view of Austria’s size. Another advantage that
has been shown to be valid for EMS-countries (Giavazzi and Pagano
1988) may also apply to Austria, namely that it was able to
‘export’ its responsibility for restrictive policies to Frankfurt,
by attributing the consequences of restrictive policy to the
Bundesbank.
Monopolistic coordination finds its justification in its
stabilizing function. As Spahn (1991) argues: “Every monetary
production economy needs an institution providing an anchor of
stability for prices and price expectations. In a closed economy
this job is - and should be - done by the centralbank. In an open
system one country has to take over the stabilising function. We
should bear in mind that the Brettoñ-Woods system finally broke
down precisely because countries with a stable monetary, system
were forced to import inflationary pressures from abroad.”3)
3) Belongia and Chrystal (1990) discuss some of the disadvantages
of exchange rate targeting. They focus particular attention to
the costs of a real exchange rate shock associated with setting
— ——3-,— _-4- 4 ..‘ 4 4-, 1~ 4 4 ~ 414~.Y’4 ~1~,, 1 t~T7~~)8
Monetary Policy
The development of the hard currency policy required alterations
of monetary policy. Generally speaking, the room for manoeuvre for
monetary policy was reduced and subordinated under the exchange
rate target.
From the breakdown of Bretton Woods until 1979, monetary policy
tried to keep nominal long-term interest rates stable while
pursuing the exchange rate objective for the indicator. The
domestic interest rate level, it was believed, should be protected
as far as possible from exogenous influences in order to stabilize
it as a cost factor. No balance of payments problems were expected
to result because of foreign exchange restrictions, market
segmentation and investors’ preferences (see Winckler 1977 and
Glück 1977).
This interest rate component of policy was maintained until 1979,
when it could no longer be defended against a sharp rise in
international interest rates. After one-third of Austria’s
international reserves was lost, interest rate policy was
redesigned from its domestic orientation towards an instrument
supporting the exchange rate’ target. This change also reflected
the view that the weakening of financial market segmentation due
to liberalisation and globalisation of world capital markets,
meant that domestic interest rates would have to become more
closely linked to international interest rates. In Austria’s case,
given the exchange rate regime, this link was more narrowly to
Germany, so the differential between Austrian and German rates
became a target for the exchange rate policy. Especially the
short-term interest rate is to be considered as an intermediate
target which is controlled by means of direct interest rate policy
(key interest rates, open market interest rates)’ or liquidity
policy measures (use of the domestic or foreign source components
of money supply creation). --9
The Loss of Monetary Autonomy
The constraint on monetary policy that is imposed by a fixed
nominal exchange rate and free capital movements can be
illustrated by a simple (monetary) model of exchange rate
determination (see, for example, Branson 1991 and Dornbusch 1980).
In the monetary approach to price determination domestic prices
are a function of domestic nominal money supply and real money
demand. With real money demand depending on real income and the
nominal interest rate the price equation reads as follows:
(1) p = m - ay + bi - x,
where:
m = logarithm of the nominal stock of domestic money
p = logarithm of the domestic price level
y = logarithm of the real GDP
i = domestic interest rate
x = represents any other factor that shifts portfolio preferences
a = income elasticity of the demand for money
b = semi-elasticity of the demand for real money balances with
respect to the interest rate.
The same relationship holds for the anchor country:
(2) p* = m* - ay* + bi* - x~
where coefficients a and b are assumed to be equal for both
countries. With open goods markets and similar consumption baskets
across countries, the domestic price level is tied to the center’s
by
(3) p = e + p~, (purchasing power parity) -10
e denoting the logarithm of the price of the home currency in
terms of the anchor currency.
This equation can be considered as goods market arbitrage
condition. (It holds less strictly, of course, the larger the
share of non-traded goods.)
Under the assumption of purchasing power parity, equations (1) and
(2) can be combined to an equation for the exchange rate of these
two countries:
(4) e = (m - m*) - a( y- y*) + b (i - i*) — (x - x*).
The model establishes that relative changes in money supply,
interest rate and real income affect the exchange rate. An
increase in the money supply at home leads to an equiproportionate
depreciation. Because an increase in domestic real income raises
the demand for real balances and thus leads to a fall in domestic
prices it induces an offsetting exchange rate appreciation.
Relatively higher domestic interest rates, by contrast, reduce the
demand for real balances, raise prices, and therefore bring about
an exchange depreciation.
With free capital movements, the domestic interest rate is tied to
the center’s by the financial market arbitrage condition
(5) ±= i~ + ~e’ + rp,
where ~e’ is the expected change of the exchange rate and rp is
the risk premium.
With a nominal exchange rate peg and sufficient credibility of
this policy, ~e’ would be zero.
Combining equations (4) and (5) and solving for m, the constraint
on domestic monetary policy is: -
(6) m = e + m* + a (y - y*) - b (Le’ + rp) + (x - x*)11
With e fixed, ~e’ is zero; given that rp, which is minimized when
e is fixed, as well as x and x~are constants, the following
first-difference (A) relationship holds:
(7) ~m = Am* + aj. (Ày — Ay*)
Domestic nominal money growth is therefore determined by the
anchor country’s money supply growth and the real economic growth
differential between these two countries. As a result, inflation
rates and nominal interest rates are also closely tied together
when e is fixed by the domestic monetary authority. In such an
economy, the central bank is restricted to influence only the
sources of money creation, i.e. domestic or foreign component, but
not its magnitude.
Credibility and Reputation
Issues of credibility and reputation and their benefits have been
central to the transformation of exchange rate and monetary policy
in Austria over the past 20 years4).
Credibility refers to the extent to which beliefs concerning a
certain policy conform to official announcements about this
policy. To achieve credibility, the authorities must precommit
themselves to a particular policy rule. Credibility may thus also
be viewed as a measure of the degree to which policymakers tie
their hands on future policies to their public policy -
announcements. Reputation, on the other hand, is the probability
which the public assigns to the consistent pursuit of a certain
policy. It is derived by learning over time from the actual
behavior of the monetary authorities (Weber 1991).
4) The role of credibility and reputation was first modeled by
Kydland and Prescott (1977) and further developed by Barro and
- Gordon (1983). The distinguishing feature of this work is that
government is not exogenous in the analysis. Policy is made
endogenous by specifying a government objective function and
assuming that the government maximizes its objective under the
constraints imposed by private equilibrium behavior (Persson12
In order to obtain credibility, two elements are needed: First, an
economic program must be feasible, stand the test of professional
scrutiny, and reflect the experience of, and lessons from, other
episodes. Second, policy commitments must not be susceptible to
the time inconsistency problem, providing incentives to change the
policy direction in mid-course. Policymakers must demonstrate that
they are willing to continue an announced policy. For example, the
adoption of a rule-based policy framework can reduce discretion
and the perception of arbitrariness and, thereby, strengthen
confidence in the policy-making process (Calvo and Frenkel 1991).
In the beginning, the hard currency policy was not widely
perceived to be feasible (see Hochreiter and Winckler 1991 for
more detail). The measures taken in 1974 were followed by a
massive deterioration of the current account deficit which reached
4,4 % of GDP in 1977. The strategy became increasingly criticized
and confidence that it could be maintained was low. Industry
opposed this policy and favoured a real exchange rate rule instead
of pegging to the German mark. There was also criticism in
academic circles and international organisations.
In this period, however, the central bank did not leave any doubt
that it would maintain its exchange rate objectives, and if
necessary, intervene and adjust the interest rate differential to
whatever level required. Key policymakers had come to the
conclusion that it was the economy which had to adjust to the
exchange rate and not the other way around. A deviation from the
course would leave central bank, budget, and unions worse off.
Later, in October 1978, in order to placate critics of the policy
a realignment in the snake was handled in such a way that the
schilling lost about 1 % against the German mark.-Obviously, thi~-
change was inconsistent, so that credibility and reputation wer
damaged.
In 1979, however, when oil prices rose quickly in the wake of tL
Iranian revolution, the idea of appreciating the nominal exchan -
rate to keep inflationary pressures low was again brought into13
discussion, and in September of that year the schilling was
revalued against the German mark by 1 1/2 percent, followed by
gradual appreciations until late 1981 amounting finally to 4 1/2
percent. Since then, the schilling/mark relation remained nearly
constant.
Subsequently, credibility and also reputation were rebuilt.
Official and press statements increasingly supported the policy.
Also industry finally dropped its opposition. Thus, the public
attached increasingly high probability to the consistent pursuit
of the announced policy. The argument which nowadays is often used
in connection with the EMS, that by a policy of this kind a
country is enabled to borrow anti-inflationary reputation from the
Bundesbank by credibly fixing the exchange rate to the German
mark, was first adopted, credibly maintained and validated in the
Austrian case.
Me~suringCredibility
The credibility of a currency peg is often measured by the
interest rate differential. A low interest rate is usually
considered as the reward for a successful buildup of credibility.
If the pegging country achieves better fundamentals, interest
rates can even be lower than in the anchor country. This will,
however, be the exceptional case. Usually the country pegging to a
stable anchor currency has a positive risk premium, or interest
rates are in general a bit higher than those of the reference
currency. In Austria the ‘necessary’ interest rate differential to
Germany was considered to be up to one percentage point in the
early eighties, but has decreased in the wake of ever increasing
capital mobility and rising credibility of Austrian exchange rate
policy. -
When credibility is endangered the interest rate differential may
temporarily rise considerably, however. This was the- experience of
the Netherlands: In March 1983 an unexpected, though small, -
devaluation of the r~utchguilder against the Deutsche mark led to-- - 14
a remarkable change in market sentiment. Interest rates, which had
been about three-quarters of a percentage point below German rates
in the first quarter of the year, rose to about one percentage
point above German rates after the devaluation. It took quite a
long time until confidence was restored sufficiently to allow
interest rate differentials to return to pre-devaluation levels.
The Dutch central bank has interpreted this as an indication for
the need to evaluate each policy measure more carefully with
regard to its effects on credibility.
Similarily, Virén (1989) finds little sensitivity of interest
rates in Finland, Iceland and Norway to interest rates abroad in
his study on interest rates, capital movements and monetary
autonomy in the EFTA countries. He concludes that relatively high
domestic interest rates in these countries do not indicate a lack
of capital mobility, but rather the problems these countries have
experienced in terms of the credibility of the official exchange
rate policy ruleS).
In Austria, credibility of exchange rate policies might have
suffered between 1984 and 1987 because of a surge in domestic
inflation, a deterioration in the current account and a negative
growth differential. Just as in the Dutch case the rise in the
interest rate differential can be considered as an indicator of
this credibility loss6).
The inflation rate (as measured by the change in the consumer
price index) surged in Austria in 1984 (chart 1) to a large part
because of an increase in the value added tax (VAT) and a
considerable rise in administered prices. In 1984, the 5,6 percent
Austrian inflation rate was about 2 points higher than a year
earlier and about 3 points higher than in Germany; Austrian
5) There may be imperfect substitutability of these assets due to
tax treatment, tax or other sources of sovereign risk which
mediate against this interpretation, however. Kool and
Tatom (1988) provide evidence that short-term interest rates
are not closely correlated across G-5 countries in the 1977-87
period. Nevertheless, long-term rates are significantly linked,
so that, if real rates are arbitraged across countries, then
long-run inflation rares are expected to be similar as well.
6) This view is not generally held in Austria but it makes sense15
inflation (and interest rates) remained high relative to German~
until the second half of 19887). Episodes like this should
reinforce or enhance credibility, although it is premature to
assert that this really also occurred. Nevertheless, this example
of a temporary widening in the interest rate spread suggests that
it is a useful measure of credibility.
III. Empirical Evidence on Convergence and Coordination
The alterations in Austrian policy coordination since 1970 suggest
that there should be evidence of convergence between Austrian and
German economic developments, especially for nominal aggregates.
The outcome for growth of output, current account, fiscal
deficits, and unemployment may not be so clear on a priori
grounds. Some casual evidence of convergence can be obtained by
examining the data in Table 1. More direct evidence based on
causality tests also is provided below.
Since the early l970s, Austria. succeeded in reducing its inflation
rate by more than the reduction in Germany; generally, however,
its inflation has been higher than in Germany. Chart 1 shows the
rate of increase of consumer prices and the levels of nominal
short and long-term interest rates. The chart also suggests that
inflation and interest rates have exhibited some tendency to
converge in the 1980s. Another nominal measure, unit labor costs
in manufacturing, is a widely used measure for price performance
and competitiveness because it largely excludes the sheltered
sector. This measure also shows a tendency to converge (see
table 1) because faster growth in Austrian productivity has offset
faster wage growth in Austria.
According to table 1, there also has been some convergence in the
growth rate of real GDP since the early l970s, although this has
been associated with slower growth for Austria. Austria’s external
7) A withholding tax on interest receipts was introduced at the
same time and kept in force until mid-1986. But the tax, rate
was too low (7 1/2 % in 1984 and 5 % thereafter) to fully -
~xniRin the rise in the interest differential.16
position moved toward balance over the three periods shown in the
table, but it has consistently been in deficit compared with
Germany’s persistent surpluses. Moreover, both the direction of
movement in the middle period and the relative size of the
movement -toward surplus in the last period diverge in the two
countries. --
The fiscal deficits shown in table 1 have not exhibited
convergence; the fiscal deficit worsened in the early and late-
198Os in Austria, but worsened by a smaller amount in Germany in
the early 1980s and improved in the late 1980s. Since 1989, of
course, the German deficit has moved up (to 2,1 percent of GDP in
1991) while that in Austria has declined (to 3,3 percent in 1991),
so that the two have converged to a degree. Finally the
un-employment rate in the two countries, like real GDP growth, has
moved in the same direction in each period, but the rise,
especially in the early 1980s, has been smaller in Austria than in
Germany. This relative success is typically attributed to
Austria’s specific policy mix, oácasionally referred to as
“Austrokeynesianism”.
- Generally speaking, the convergence of economic fundamentals with
those of the center country has been realised to a relatively high
extent. In AuStria’s case, the disciplinary effects of
coordination to Germany were earned, but this fact did not entail
tying every aspect of the real economy to the German one. The
experience suggests that pegging the exchange rate does not
necessarily imply that, for instance, the inflation-unemployment
trade-off of the anchor country had to be fully accepted - at
least not in -the longer run, when the structural characteristics
- of the labor markets (comparatively high real wage flexibility in
Austria) dominate (Hochreiter - Knöbl 1991). Also, a much less
favourable current account balance was sustained in Austria ovei
long period.- 17
Some Evidence on Coordination -
Economic theory indicates that monetary authorities can only
achieve an exchange rate objective by surrendering other
objectives of monetary policy. For example, the independent use of
monetary policy to achieve a domestic inflation objective requires
that the exchange rate be free to reflect monetary developments
abroad. Thus, in the first of the three distinct Austrian monetary
regimes identified above, the Bretton-Woods period, Austrian
monetary aggregates, price level and other nominal measures were
determined by the committment to maintain a fixed price of the
U.S.Dollar and other currencies. In the second regime, limited
floating was allowed against each currency with the aim of
pursuing a domestic inflation goal. During this period (from the
breakdown of the Bretton Woods agreement (111/1971) to the
breakdown of the limited-floating regime), monetary measures were
more discretionary. Finally, since 111/1979 Austrian monetary
policy has been characterized as a “hard currency option” and has
been narrowly focused on efforts to fix the DM/AS exchange rate.
During this period, Austrian monetary and other nominal measures
should be determined by German economic developments.
To test whether these characterizations are supported by the data,
Granger causality tests are conducted for each period for the
relationship between Austrian~ and German money stocks (Ml and M3),
consumer prices, industrial production, and interest rates. If the
coordination hypotheses above are correct, then in the latest
period (111/1979 to IV/l989), German money, prices and interest
rates should cause, in a Granger sense, their Austrian
counterparts and, due to the asymmetry of the coordination, the
Austria measures should have no influence on German develop-
ments8). That is, causality should be unidirectional.-If German
8) The period ends in 1989 to avoid the distortionary influence of
the temporary abandonment of the price stability goal by the
Bundesbank when they implemented a fixed convertibility peg to
the East German Mark as part of the unification process. As a
result, there was a monetary shock to West Germany and
countries pegging to the DM,as the adjustment to this
transition progressed. While the results described here should
not be altered by these developments in any qualitative way,.
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monetary policy becomes more causally significant for Austrian
nominal developments and if monetary factors play a major role in
the German cyclical experience, the cyclical experience of the two
countries should also become more closely linked. To test this
linkage, each country’s industrial production growth is also
examined. -
During the previous period (111/1971 to 11/1979), Austrian
economic developments are expected to be less systematically
influenced by developments abroad. In particular, since both
Austria and Germany had floating rates between themselves and
other countries, there is no a priori reason for a causal relation
in either direction for the nominal variables. Finally, in the
earliest period for which data are available (generally 1/1960 to
11/1971), both Germany and Austria were participants in the
Bretton Woods arrangements, so that their domestic nominal
economic measures were related to a degree; in this period Granger
causality could arise and in either direction.
The Granger causality test was conducted for each variable in each
period using the same procedure. First, the univariate time series
process of the growth rate (first-difference ir~ the logarithm) was
determined for the Austrian and German measure, then up to eight
quarterly lagged values of the counterpart variable for the other
country were tested to determine if the past behavior of the
measure in Germany (Austria) had statistically significant
explanatory power for the same variable in Austria (Germany)9). A
five percent significance level is used as the test criterion. For
interest rates, simple first-differences of the variables are
enough so that this brief experience could bias the results.
9) The Q-statistics reported in tables 2 to 7 are Box-Pierce
statistics to test for white-noise residuals with 12 lags. None
of these statistics are statistically significant, indicating
that the residuals for the test equations are white-noise.The
test equations were also estimated using first-order moving
average error processes. There is some evidence that MA1 error
processes are significant for industrial production and German
long-term interest rates when they substitute for auto-
regressive processes that are otherwise significant. The auto-
regressive processes used below fit the data better for the
univariate and causality test equations than when the MA -terms
are included and insignificant AR terms are deleted. In -
addition, no causality test result is altered when MA terms are- 19
used. First-differences (A) are used because all of the measures
are nonstationary. The numbers in parantheses in table 2 to 8 are
computed as t-statistics.
Money Stock (Ml)
Table 2 gives the causality tests for money stock (Ml) growth in
each country. The Ml data are not seasonally adjusted, so seasonal
dummies are included for the first (Si), second (S2) and third
quarters (S3). The same test was conducted without the seasonal
dummy variables and the results were identical. In the first
period, Austrian Mi growth (M1A) is AR2, but there is evidence of
causality by German Ml growth over the previous two quarters. This
causality is unidirectional, as no lag of Austrian Ml growth
significantly influences German Ml growth. During the second
period, Ml growth is independent in each country, as hypothesized.
During the latest period of coordination, there is also evidence
of unidirectional causality from German Mi growth to Austrian Ml
growth.
MQn~etaryAggregate M3
Table 3 presents similar results for M3 growth. During the initial
period, no evidence was found for causality for M3 growth in one
country by M3 growth in the other. The closest result to
statistical significance is when one lag of German M3 growth is
added to the reported Austrian equation; in this case, the t-
statistic for this term is 1.80, which is not significant at a 5
percent level. In the second period, there is again no causality
from German M3 growth to Austrian M3 growth, but the test yields
evidence of causality from Austrian M3 growth. This result is
unexpected and is not consistent with the other results for this
period. In the final period, German M3 growth causes Austrian M3
growth and reverse causality is rejected. The latter supports the
coordination hypothesislO).
10) Causality tests for monetary base measures reveal an absence
of causality in all three periods (the first begins in 1962- 20
Consumer Prices
Table 4 presents causality results for the consumer price index.
These results are somewhat more mixed than for the other
variables. In particular, in the first period, when both country’s
inflation rates are expected to depend more on reserve currency
growth outside the two countries, there is some evidence of
causality from Austrian inflation to German inflation. This result
is dubious, however, because it only arises with an unusually long
pure time delay of 4 to 6 quarters. In the second period, there is
causality from the German rate of price increase to that in
Austria. In the coordination period, the results again show that
German developments play a causal role in Austria, but Austrian
nominal developments, like inflation, do not cause their German
counterpart.
Industrial Production
Table 5 shows the causality results for the growth rate of
industrial production in each country. In all three periods the
growth of German industrial production causes growth of industrial
production in Austria. Only in the last period is there any
evidence of causality from Austrian industrial production growth
to German industrial production growth. This may not reflect any
influence of the exchange rate regime, however, because the
overall effect is zero (the sum of the lagged growth rates equals
O.2750,t = 0.92). Nevertheless the evidence is consistent with a
tightening in the relationship between the real sectors of the two
economy.
noise, except for the German base in the coordination period,
which is AR?. This absence of causality, given the results for
Mi and M3, suggests that the existing measures of the base are
inadequate for capturing monetary policy actions. For example,
neither measure includes excess reserves. Also, unusual
movements in the currency ratio affect the base associated
with a given level of the money stock. For this reason, the
targeting and measurement of the monetary base was abandoned
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Long-term Interest Rates
Table 6 shows the causality results for long-term interest rates.
Only the 1971-79 and 1979-89 periods are reported because of data
availability. The quarterly average of monthly bond yields on 10-
year government bonds are used for each country. During the
limited-floating rate period, long rates show unidirectional
causality from Germany and Austria, while there is bidirectional
causality in the i980s. The former result, like the CPI results
above for 1971-79, suggests that monetary authorities in Austria
were influenced by external developments in Germany, despite the
limited floating that took place. The causality from German to
Austrian long rates in the 1980s is insensitive to whether three
lags, only the significant third lag, or no lags of the change in
the Austrian rate are included. The bidirectional causality for
long rates in the coordination period is not typical of the other
results, but it suggests that adjustments in financial markets are
not as asymmetric for long rates under such coordination11).
Short-terms Interest Rates
The results for short-term rates in table 7 are more consistent
with the hypotheses. The short-term rate in Austria and Germany
are the quarterly averages of monthly interest rates on 3-month
government securities. During the latest period, the hypothesis of
unidirectional causality from Germany to Austria is not rejected.
During the limited-floating period, changes in short-term rates in
each country are independent of changes in short-term rates in the
other country. Finally, in the earliest period, there is
unidirectional causality from Germany to Austria; this may reflect --
ii) Note that the equation for the German long rate in the 1980s
indicate a negative effect of Austrian rates on German rates.
When the two past Austrian changes are constrained to have no
total effect on the German rate, however, the constraint -
cannot be rejected (t = - 1.09). The constrained effect is
- 0.6787 (t= - 2.54) in the first quarter and 0.6787 in the
next quarter. Thus, the curious suggested causality from
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the dominance of the larger German economy in inducing real
economic changes in Austria under fixed exchange ratesi2).
Cointegration of Short-term Interest Rates
The strong, close connection between German and Austrian short-
term interest rates since 1979 and its attribution to Austrian
economic policy actions is supported by the causality results.
Stronger evidence of this relation is found in cointegration
testsl3). For the coordination period, the cointegration vector
is:
(8) ISAt = 1.7145 + 0.8256 ISGt + Rt
(5.92) (20.79)
= 0.913 S.E. = 0.6522 D.W. = 1.07
The residual, Rt, is stationary according to the Dickey-Fuller
test recommended by Engle and Granger (1987). In particular,
(9) ARt = - 0.5394 Rt-l
(-3.82)
and no lags of the dependent varaible are significant. The t-
statistic is much larger in absolute value than the critical value
(5 percent) of 3.37 given in Engle and Granger, table 214).
Such a strong long-run relationship between these short rates does
not hold in either of the earlier periods, even though the same
12) In the fixed rate period, only the fifth lag of the change in
the German rate is statistically significant and only when it
is included alone instead of along with the first four lags.
When the causality test is conducted with no lagged dependent
variables, Austrian rates still have no statistically
significant effect on German rates.
13) If variables are cointegrated, then causality tests involving
- their first-differences can be biased against rejecting the
absence of ‘causality by omitting a significant lagged residual
from the cointegrating vector from the causality test
equation. In both of the causality equations for Austrian
short-rates and for Austrian inflation such a consideration
has no effect on the reported causality test results.
14) The reverse cointegrating vector yields the same statistically -
significant evidence of cointegration in the coordination
period of the 1980s and not in the other two periods.23
unidirectional causality from German to Austrian rates holds in
the fixed rate period. In the floating rate period, ISG is not
significant in the cointegrating vector (t = 1.88); moreover, the
t—statistic on the lagged residual in testing its stationarity is
only - 2.79, which is small enough in absolute value to reject
stationarity.
In the fixed rate period, the cointegrating vector is:
(10) ISA = - 0.7837 + 0.5897 ISG
(—1.22) (4.69)
R2
= 0.319 S.E. = 2.2802 D.W. = 0.181
and the stationarity test results are:
(11) ARt = - 0.0773 R~-j.
(-1.20)
R2
= 0.03 S.E. = 0.9554 D.W. = 2.10 Q(12) = 9.08
(12) ARt = - 0.1161 Rt—1 + 0.3929 ARt_4
(—1.78) (2.57)
R2
= 0.149 S.E. = 0.9382 D.W. = 2.03 0(11) = 4.18
In both cases stationarity of the residual, and hence cointe-
gration, are rejected.
Since arbitrage should tie expected real rates of return across
countries together, expected inflation should also be cointegrated
when nominal rates are. A check of the time series properties of
consumer prices in Austria and Germany over the three regime
periods indicates that they are 1(2) in all three periods.
Inflation is cointegrated in at least the second and third
periods, however15). The cointegrating vectors and residual tests
15) The augmented Dickey-Fuller test for cointegration indicates
that the levels of consumer prices in Germany and Austria are
cointegrated in only the last period, 111/1979 to 11/1991.
This result is marginal, however, and only marginally better
than in the first period. In particular, in the latest period
the t-statistic on the lagged residual (when a significant
fourth and eight lagged dependent variable are included) is
-3.23, only slightly larger in absolute value than the
critical value of -3.17, or the -3.16 value obtained for the
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for each of the three periods are given in table 8. The
coefficient on German inflation in the first period is not
statistically significant at a 5 percent level, although it is
close (6.7 percent). In the subsequent periods, the coefficient on
German inflation is statistically significant and the residual is
stationary, according to the significant t-values on the lagged
residuals in the respective cointegration tests. Thus, inflation
in Germany and Austria are cointegrated, at least since the
breakdown of the Bretton Woods agreement. It is not surprising,
then, that nominal interest rates have been cointegrated since
-1979; indeed, it is more surprising that these interest rates were
not cointegrated earlier.
Summary
The evidence presented in this section is strongly supportive of
the hypotheses above, especially the coordination hypotheses.
Money growth, inflation, industrial production growth and short-
term interest rates all exhibit strong unidirectional causality
from Germany to Austria in the 1980s. There is causality in long
rates too, but it appears to be bidirectional. In the previous
floating rate period, short-term rates, and monetary growth for
both Ml and M3 are independent in each country, as would be
expected with floating rates and independent monetary policies.
Consumer prices show bidirectional causality during this period,
however, but this may reflect the relative importance of common
external price shocks on both countries. Finally, in the first
period when policy in each country was constrained to a fixed
exchange rate regime, the results are mixed. M3 growth in each
country shows complete independence from the other, but Ml growth
and short-term interest rate changes show uniderectional causality
from Germany to Austria, while inflation shows a peculiar reversal
of this unidirectionaL causality.
dependent variables are statistically significant and25
IV. Conclusions
Austrian monetary and exchange rate policy have evolved quite
successfully into a coordinated policy that has improved the
performance of the Central Bank in achieving its twin objectives
of stabilizing the internal and external value of the currency. In
this process, policymakers have sought to exploit the advantages
of credibility by building a reputation for sticking to their
policy. The evidence presented suggests they have succeeded. These
accomplishments have not been without a few major departures that
temporarily cost reputation, however.
Austrian coordination is one-sided or monopolistic by choice, but
also by necessity. A more discretionary Austrian exchange rate
policy would have created only minor external costs abroad, so
that foreign policymakers would have had little incentive to
forceably impose or negotiate a coordinated policy with Austria.
On the other hand, the relative importance of international trade
to Austria and its commitment to price stability require that
foreign externalities be minimized. The movement from the Bretton
Woods arrangement, which, in principle at least, provided a degree
of trade, exchange rate and domestic price stability until it
broke down, through the limited floating regime to the current
hard currency policy offers interesting contrasts in efforts to
secure the Central Bank goals and their Outcomes.,
The discussion and evidence show that by passively coordinating
domestic monetary policy to German monetary policy decisions
through the active enforcement of the fixed exchange rate, Austria
has successfully tied its nominal economic performance - its
inflation rate, interest rates and nominal income growth - to
Germany’s. These outcomes were the deliberate choice of
policymakers who saw these nominal outcomes to be superior to the
alternatives available through other policies and who recognized
the independent benefits for the economy of building (by -
importing) credibility and reputation for committment to the hard
currency policy. These accomplishments have apparently not
required tying the real performance of the Austrian- economy to any26
adverse permanent real consequences of German monetary policy, in
particular, to its inflation-unemployment trade off.
The principal risk of Austrian-style coordination, which now has
spread to several other countries, is that the center country will
temporarily abandon-its commitment to price stability. In this
event, like the breakdown of Bretton Woods, the small open
economies would unexpectedly and passively confront the same
implicit c.~~cice. The twin goals of stabilizing- the external and
internal value of the currency will not be met without finding a
new anchor. The unprecedented pressures on German monetary
authorities created by unification and their response to it
suggest that such concerns are easily overstated.
Periodic challenges to nolicymakers’ commitments, like those
examined in the paper, show that temporary departures from policy
commitments can have relatively high real costs to the economy.
Because such departures have reputational effects, these costs
persist. Thus, the ca-se for stability in policy rules, even in the
face of perceived short-term inefficiencies in these policies,
appears, from the Austrian perspective, to be as strong, or
stronger, than proponents of the critical role of reputation have
suggested.27
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Mean (Standard Deviation) -
Austria Germany
Inflation (%)
1971-78 6.6 (1.97) 5.2 (1.51)
1979-84 5.2 (1.42) 4.5 (1.49)
1985-89 2.2 (0.71) 1.3 (1.25)
Unit Labor Cost (%)
1971—78 6.1 (5.21) 5.6 (3.87)
1979-84 2.0 (3.38) 3.1 (3.77)
1985—89 0.1 (2.83) 1.5 (1.71)
Real GDP Growth (%)
1971-78 3.6 (2.42) 2.7 (2.33)
1979-84 2.0 (1.71) 1.6 (1.73)
1985—89 2.6 (1.22) 2.7 (0.98)
Current Account Balance (% of GDP) -
1971—78 —1.5 (1.35) 1.2 (0.77)
1979-84 -0.8 (1.32) 0.1 (1.22)
1985-89 -0.1 (0.25) - 4.0 (0.98)
Fiscal Deficit (% of GDP)
1971-78 -2.6 (1.85) -1.4 (1.08)
1979-84 -3.9 (1.08) -2.0 (0.34)
1985-89 -4.5 (0.48) —1.2 (0.36)
Unemployment Rate (% of Labor Force)
1971-78 - 1.9 (0.23) 3.0 (1.71)
- 1979-84 3.2 (1.19) 6.6 (2.48)
1985-89 - 5.2 (0.30) 8.7 (0.52)31
Table 2
Some Causality Results For Money Growth (Ml)
in Austria and Germany
Period 1
(1/1960-11/1971)
M1A-t = - 0.0078 + 0.2166 M1A-t-]. - 0.5467 M1A-t-2
(-0.82) (1.42) (-3.72)
+ 0.1675 M1G-t-]. + 0.3855 M1G-t_2
(1.10) - (2.51)
+ 0.0088S1 + 0.04O8S2 + 0.0473S3
- (0.94) (3.18) (3.61)
R2
= 0.89 S.E. = 0.0093 D.W. = 2.00 0(10) = 3.70
M1G causes M1A : F2,35 = 4.44; critical value = 3.26
M1G-t = 0.0435 - 0.0750 Si - 0.0048 S2 - 0.0200 S3
(13.44) (—16.39) (—1.07) (4.36)
R2
= 0.885 S.E. = 0.0107 D.W. = 1.42 0(12) = 9.69
M1A does not cause M1G
Period 2
(11/1971—111/1979)
M1A = 0.0086 - 0.0139 Si + 0.0189 S2 + 0.0422 S3
(0.72) (—0.82) (1.11) (2.48)
R2
= 0.231 S.E. = 0.0339 D.W. = 1.62 Q(12) = 4.97
M1G does not cause M1A
M1G = 0.0437 - 0.0966 Si + 0.0130 S2 — 0.0354 S3 -




= 0.851 S.E. = 0.0142 D.W. = 2.00- Q(ll) = 8.30
M1A does not cause M1G -‘ -32
Periad~
(III/l979—IV/1989) -
M1A = 0.0003 - 0.0636 Si + 0.0809 S2 - 0.0027 S3




= 0.760 S.E. = 0.0158 D.W. = 1.53 Q(12) = 8.13
M1G causes M1A -
M1G = 0.0554 - 0.1184 Si - 0.0159 S2 - 0.0554 S3
(14.35) (—13.11) (-1.82) (—10.25)
+ 0.4305 M1Gt-i
(2.90)
= 0.899 S.E. = 0.0118 D.W. = 1.99 0(11) = 8.29
M1A does not cause M1G33
Table 3
Some Causality Results For M3 Growth
in Austria and Germany
Period 1
M3A = 0.0030 + 0.0140 Si + 0.015 S2 + 0.0213 S3




= 0.607 S.E. = 0.0054 D.W. = 1.79 0(11) = 9.22
M3G does not cause- M3A
M3G = 0.0444 - 0.0125 Si - 0.0b97 S2 - 0.0100 S3
(10.92) (-3.12) (—2.98) (-2.94)
- 0.4592 M3Gt-5
(-2.74)
= 0.541 S.E. = 0.0070 D.W. = 1.82 0(11) = 8.54
M3h does not cause M3G
Period 2
M3A = 0.0401 + 0.0118 Si + 0.0024 S2 + 0.0136 S3




= 0.203 SE. = 0.0102 D.W. = 1.80 0(11) = 5.12
M3G does not cause M3A
M3G = 0.0458 - 0.0339 Si - ‘0.0290 S2 - 0.0249 S3
(14.32) (-7.49) (—6.40) (—5.49)
R2
= 0.672 S.E. = 0.0091 D.W. = 1.75 Q(12) = 9.50
M3A does not cause M3G- 34
Period 3
M3A = 0.0151 + 0.2838 M3G-t-i
(6.12) (2.18)
R2
= 0.08 S.E. = 0.0i02 D.W. = 1.58 0(12) = 11.44
M3G causes M3A
M3G = 0.0335 - 0.0241 Si - 0.0283 S2 — 0.0232 S3
(20.28) (-10.08) (—11.81) (—9.90)
R2
= 0.810 S.E. = 0.0055 D.W. = 1.70 0(12) = 13.30
M3A does not cause M3G35
Table 4
Causality Results For The Rate of Increase of
Consumer Prices in Austria and Germany
Period 1
PAt = 0.0150 - 0.0541 PAt-i - 0.6487 PAt-2
(7.60) (—0.46) (—5.48)
R2
= 0.401 S.E. = 0.0085 D.W. = 2.10 0(12) = 9.43
PG does not cause PA
PG-t = 0.0012 + 0.1570 PGt-1 - 0.5868 PGt_2 + 0.0060 PAt-i
(0.33) (1.01) (—3.45) (0.05)
+ 0.1715 PAt-2 + 0.1968 PAt..3 + 0.3536 PA-t_4
(1.56) (1.55) (2.81)
+ 0.0012 PAt-S + 0.2463 PAt-6
(0.01) (2.30)
- R2
= 0.423 S.E. = 0.0053 D.W. = 1.84 Q(9) = 7.93
PA causes PG : F6,34 = 2.92, critical value = 2.49
Period 2: -
PA-t = - 0.0064 - 0.6190 PA-t-1 - 0.4074 PA-t-2 - 0.5549 PAt-3
(-1.93) (-2.97) (-2.33) (—3.30)
+ 0.4247 PGt-1 + 0.1919 PGt-2 + 0.2200 PGt-3
(1.62) (0.79) - (0.90) -





= 0.649 S.E. = 0.0042 D.W. = 1.87 Q(9) = 5.96
PG causes PA : F7,21 = 7.87; critical value = 2.4936
PG-t = 0.0009 + 0.3177 PG-t-]. - 0.2481 PG-t-2 + 0.2334 PGt-3




= 0.598 S.E. = 0.0040 D.W. = 1.84 0(8) = 5.16
PA does not cause PG
Period 3
PAt = 0.0030 - 0.1621 PA-t-j. + 0.0475 PA-t-2 - 0.1183 PAt-3
(1.42) (—1.05) (0.37) (-0.94)
+ 0.4713 PA-t-4 + 0.5570 pGti
(3.48) (2.77)
R2
= 0.457 S.E. = 0.0060 D.W. = 1.72 0(8) = 8.51
PG causes PA
PGt = 0.0012 + 0.7010 PGt-l - 0.4016 PGt-2 + 0.5155 PGt-3
(1.04) (5.13) (-2.54) (4.00)
R2
= 0.540 S.E. = 0.0044 D.W. = 2.18 0(9) = 2.63
PA does not cause PG- 37
Table 5
Causality Results For Industrial Production
Growth in Austria and Germany
Period 1
ALIPA = 0.0120 - 0.4884 ALIPAt_i + 0.4135 ALIPGt_1
(2.52) (-3.47) (2.40)
+ 0.1879 ALIPGt..2 + 0.3570 ALIPGt.3
(1.15) (2.17)
R2




= 0.0 S.E. = 0.0203 D.W. = 1.75 0(12) = 13.41
LEA does not cause IPG
Period 2
ALIPA = 0.0055 + 0.2875 ALIPGt_i + 0.4390 ALIPGt_2
(1.57) (1.42) (2.15)
R2
= 0.217 S.E. = 0.0192 D.W. = 2.54 Q(i2) = 6.67
IPG causes IPA : F 5,26 = 3.53; critical value = 2.64
ILIPG = 0.0053 + 0.3747 ALIPG-t_j. - 0.1287 ALIPGt_2
(1.70) -(2.11) (—0.66)
+ 0.2105 ALIPGt_3 + 0.1419 ALIPGt-4 - 0.5779 ALIPGt_5
(1.10) (0.72) (-3.21)
R2
= 0.290 S.E. = 0.0165 D.W. = 1.68 ‘Q(7) = 4.33
IPA does not cause IPG38
Per iod3
ALIPAt = 0.0056 + 0.3164 ALIPGt_i
(2.31) (2.36) -
R2
= 0.10 S.E. = 0.0153 D.W. = 2.07 0(12) = 15.03
ALIPAt = 0.0031 + 0.3377 ALIPAt_5 + 0.3617 ALIPGt-].
(1.24) (2.42) (2.82)
R2
= 0.197 S.E. = O.0i45 D.W. = 2.02 0(11) = 9.10
IPG causes IPA --
ALIPG = 0.0012 + 0.1280 ALIPAt_i + 0.3974 ALIPAt_2
(0.40) (0.89) (2.78)
- 0.3098 ALIPAt_3 - 0.231 ALIPAt_4 + 0.2906 ALIPAt_5
(-2.19) - (-1.63) (2.07)
-- R2
= 0.250 S.E. = 0.0146 D.W. = 2.25 0(12) = 7.42
IPA causes IPG : F 5,36 = 3.72; critical value = 2.4839
Table 6 -
Causality Results For Long-term Interest Rates
in Austria and Germany
Period 2
LILA = 0.0124 + 0.3864 AILAt_1 + 0.2384 AILGt1
(0.27) (2.48) (2.40)
R2
= 0.292 S.E. = 0.2566 D.W. = 1.81 Q(il) = 3.37
ILG causes ILA
AILG = 0.0022 + 0.5183 AILGt_].
(0.03) (3.13) -
R2
= 0.221 S.E. = 0.4353 D.W. = 1.85 0(12) = 7.58
ILA does not cause ILG -
Period 3
LILA = - 0.0011 + 0.2746 LILAt_3 + 0.3298 AILGt.~.i
(-0.02) (2.09) (3.84)
R2
= 0.316 S.E. = 0.2858 D.W. = 2.06 0(11) = 8.26
ILG causes ILA





= 0.138 S.E. = 0.478 D.W. = 1.90 0(11) = 7.97
ILA causes ILG- 40
Table 7
Causality Results For Short-term Interest Rates
in Austria and Germany
Period 1
AISAt = 0.2798 + 0.0307 AISGt_l - 0.0563 AISGt_2
(2.25) (0.28) (—0.50)
-0.1951 AISGt_3 - 0.3496 AISGt_4
(-1.72) (-3.02)
R2
= 0.182 S.E. = 0.7227 D.W. = 2.43 0(8) = 12.17
ISG causes ISA : F4,36 = 3.23; critical value = 2.63
AISGt = 0.1431
(0.94)
= 0.00 S.E. = 1.0176 D.W. = 1.87 0(12) = 17.01
AISG = 0.2448 - 0.3503 AISGt_5
(1.46) (—3.26)
R2
= 0.086 S.E. = 1.0319 D.W. = 1.89 0(11) = 9.40
ISA does not cause ISG
Period 2
LISA = - 0.0417
(—0.19) -
R2
= 0.00 S.E. = 1.1411 D.W. = 2.36 Q(12) = 6.36
ISG does not cause ISA
AISG = 0.0277 + 0.4094 AISGt_1
(0.12) (2.40)
R2
= 0.133 S.E. = 1.2929 D.W. = 1.79 Q(11) = 7.05
ISA does not cause ISG41
Period 3 -
LISA = 0.0335 + 0.5507 AISGt_1
(0.32) (4.72)
R2
= 0.341 S.E. = 0.6806 D.W. = 2.17 Q(12) = 6.49
ISG causes ISA
LISG = 0.0203 + 0.4365 LISGt_1
(0.16) (3.20)
= 0.184 S.E. = 0.7958 D.W. = 2.06 Q(li) = 7.97
ISA does not cause ISG42
Table 8
Cointegration Vectors For Inflation
111960 — 11/1971
ALPA = 0.006 + 0.45i LLPG + Ri
(2.61) (1.89)
R2
= 0.05 S.E. = 0.0106 D.W. = 2.05
AR1 = - 1.711 Rit—]. + 0.651 ARit_i
(-10.00) (5.47)
R2
= 0.709 S.E. = 0.0082 D.W. -= 2.14
111/1971 — 11/1979: —
ALPA = 0.007 + 0.757 ALPG + R2
(3.16) (4.94)
R2
= 0.43 S.E. = 0.0054 D.W. = 1.61
AR2 = - 0.931 R2~_j.
(-4.87) -
R2
= 0.43 S.E. = 0.0053 D.W. = 1.76
111/1979 — 11/1991:
ALPA = 0.0043 + 0.688 LLPG + R3
(2.84) (4.30) --
R2
= 0.27 S.E. = 0.0067 D.W. = 2.63
AR3 = - 0.864 R3t-l + 0.278 LR3t_4 + 0.286 LR3t_8
(-9.4i) (2.52) (2.39) -
R2
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